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Editorial
SCOTT HAROLD*
Since the early 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has em-barked on a major modernisation drive intended to improve the ca-pabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). How have
China’s efforts to improve its military power affected its relations with its
diplomatic partners and Taiwan? Are some aspects of China’s military
modernisation drive seen as more destabilising or alarming to foreign mil-
itaries than others? What are the appropriate metrics to evaluate the im-
pact of Chinese military modernisation on its foreign relations? And what
factors determine how other countries view Chinese military modernisa-
tion? This special issue examines these questions.
China has devoted increasing resources to its national defence over the
past 20 years. During this period, the PRC has acquired a substantial num-
ber of advanced weapons systems and capabilities from abroad or devel-
oped them indigenously (sometimes after having appropriated or reverse-
engineered the intellectual property of the core technologies). (1) From a
largely outmoded military doctrine focused on low-technology ground
warfare, the PLA has moved towards an “active defence” ( jiji fangyu 积极
防御 ) doctrine that places much greater emphasis on sophisticated air and
naval platforms. (2) It has also begun to carry out integrated joint opera-
tions that emphasise simultaneous multi-service coordination designed to
enable the Chinese armed forces to fight and win “local, limited wars under
conditions of informationisation” ( xinxihua 信息化 ). These steps are in-
tended to boost the PLA’s capacity to deter China’s enemies from threat-
ening its interests and to enable it to project force at greater distances
from China’s shores than was previously the case.
Chinese official spokespersons routinely claim, as PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesman Liu Weimin recently did on 9 January 2012, that “Our
national defence modernisation serves the objective requirements of na-
tional security and… will not pose any threat to any country,” and seek to
paint any expression of concern about Chinese military strengthening as
either unreasonable or ill-intentioned. Still, as China has poured more re-
sources into its military and has begun to improve the sophistication of its
armed forces, it is undeniable that other countries have taken notice, and
many have grown concerned about the implications of these develop-
ments for their own security. International relations theorists often talk
about states as balancing capabilities versus balancing threats, and as
doing so through internal self-strengthening and/or through external al-
liances and improved defence cooperation. As the essays in this issue of
China Perspectives show, how China modernises its military – what plat-
forms it acquires and how it uses them – matters to how national security
managers in Japan, South Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and
elsewhere view China. (3) China’s military modernisation is leading many of
these countries to improve their own military hardware capabilities, adjust
their operating doctrines, and tighten up their defence cooperative rela-
tionships with the United States and other regional actors.
Methodologically, the essays in this issue evaluate the impact of China’s
military modernisation on its neighbours’ defence policies by drawing on
statements by national leaders, foreign policy and military elites, academ-
ics, and popular surveys and newspaper editorials; by examining foreign
defence budgets; by identifying foreign defence acquisitions in response to
new Chinese capabilities; and by analysing shifts in foreign militaries’ de-
fence doctrines and operating concepts aimed at addressing the new chal-
lenges posed by Chinese military capabilities. Some academics have sug-
gested that Asian states might not try to balance against a rising China be-
cause they are comfortable with a Sino-centric world order owing to their
past experiences prior to the mid-nineteenth century. (4) By contrast, the
essays in this special issue describe some of the ways that a number of
states, especially those with close defence relations with the United States
or who have territorial conflicts with China, are beginning to balance more
actively against China’s growing power through both internal strengthen-
ing and external political-military cooperation. (5) Even countries without
defence alliance relations with the United States, such as Vietnam and In-
donesia, have been upgrading their militaries by buying submarines, (6) ad-
vanced surface vessels, (7) and anti-ship missiles, (8) while also reaching out
to the US and other regional actors to help balance China. (9) It is only
countries much further afield, such as in Western Europe, that seem at
ease with China’s approach to defence modernisation, though as some of
the authors in this issue note, there are probably reasons why European
analysts should be more concerned by Chinese naval modernisation than
they have been to date.
The country that has been most active in responding to China’s defence
build-up of course has been the United States since 2009. The Obama ad-
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ministration has stated clearly and repeatedly that even as it downsizes
defence spending, it will prioritise its security interests and commitments
in the Asia-Pacific, and even increase its commitment to the region, most
markedly through a new Asia-Pacific-focused defence strategy announced
in early January 2012. (10) Washington has also developed a new approach
to guide military operations, the AirSea Battle Concept, built around
tighter integration of naval and aerospace capabilities, stealth, and long-
range precision strike designed to combat asymmetric Chinese military ca-
pabilities. (11) And the US has also moved ahead with steps to diversify its
basing options; position new forces and capabilities in the region; develop
new, advanced military hardware; enhance partner capabilities by selling or
transferring defence technologies to friendly countries; and improve inter-
operability and integration of forces and doctrines with its allies.
Many of these steps, including not only those of the United States but
also those taken by regional actors, have come about quite quickly, and are
not yet fully understood or appreciated outside of defence analysis circles.
For example, Aaron Friedberg was warning as early as 1993 that China was
planning to “abandon its traditional emphasis on large, low-technology
ground forces and [was] seeking to buy or [build] the kinds of weapons that
it would need to assert its claims against its neighbors,” which could make
Asia “ripe for rivalry.” (12) Still, for a long time, scholars and policy analysts
did not see the kinds of military balancing that traditional, neo-realist ap-
proaches to international relations theorising predicted, and some analysts
appeared to discount predictions that balancing would eventually occur if
China continued to pour resources into asymmetric military capabilities.
Indeed, major studies of China’s air force, (13) navy, (14) strategic seapower, (15)
missile forces, (16) and overall military modernisation efforts during the
1990s (17) found little evidence that PLA capabilities (with the exception of
some Israeli and Russian hardware acquisitions) were advancing quickly, al-
tering the balance of power in East Asia, or incentivising much balancing.
Similarly, an open-source study completed by David Shlapak of The RAND
Corporation in the year 2000 on the PLA threat to Taiwan found that Bei-
jing’s capabilities were probably insufficient to enable it to threaten the is-
land with military defeat. (18) It seemed that most regional actors appeared
content to profit from China’s economic expansion while leaving aside
concerns about its military power improvements. And Beijing’s actions and
statements, especially its widely-noted “charm offensive” towards South-
east Asia (19) and its emphasis on a “peaceful rise” (20) (later renamed
“peaceful development”), sought to soften the political-diplomatic and
military consequences of its defence upgrades and to discourage regional
actors from seeing Chinese capability improvements as developments ne-
cessitating counter-balancing steps.
Nonetheless, from the late-1990s onwards, US security policy, as well as
the policies of some other regional actors (especially Japan), gradually
began to shift from “engagement” towards “hedging,” (21) driven in part by
concern over Beijing’s acceleration of its efforts to acquire more advanced
military capabilities in the late 1990s. Since 1998, Beijing has increased the
PLA’s acquisition of more advanced military technologies, a process that
has been tracked since the annual US Department of Defense Report to
the Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China began
to be issued in 2000. (22) These reports, together with other studies, have
detailed the PLA’s acquisition of more numerous and more advanced bal-
listic (23) and cruise missiles (24) married to an increasingly sophisticated
overhead satellite surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting architec-
ture; (25) its computer-network operations (i.e., cyber-warfare) capabili-
ties; (26) its acquisition of increasingly modern and stealthy submarine
forces (27) and more advanced surface vessels; (28) its advances in mine war-
fare; (29) its burgeoning aircraft carrier program; (30) and its increasingly ca-
pable air superiority fighters (most notably the J-20 (31)) and fighter-
bombers. Military analysts in the US began to assess the PLA’s growing
conventional cruise and ballistic missile threat as an increasingly impor-
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tant challenge to forwards-deployed US air power and air bases as early as
1999, and warned that measures would have to be taken if US military in-
stallations in Japan, South Korea, and the Western Pacific were to be main-
tained. (32)
By the mid-2000s, US defence analysts were beginning to talk about a
growing PLA anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge to US forces in the
Western Pacific that sought to raise the costs to foreign militaries of op-
erating from bases or ports near to China (anti-access) or from operating
in waters or air spaces that China chooses to contest (area denial). (33) The
package of capabilities described above are often described as being part
of an “assassin’s mace” ( shashoujian 杀手锏 ), or a cluster of asymmetric
“trump card” capabilities comprised of relatively inexpensive yet hard to
defend-against weapons that could negate a more powerful military’s
strength advantages at a low cost. Because many of China’s neighbours
(including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines) are heavily re-
liant on US extended deterrence guarantees, China’s acquisition of military
capabilities expressly designed to erode or undermine US forces’ abilities
to operate in the Western Pacific has fuelled efforts by these states to de-
velop new capabilities of their own and tighten defence cooperation with
the United States and other regional actors. (34)
As the essays in this issue describe, efforts by Japan, South Korea, and
Australia to respond to the challenges China’s military modernisation
poses have been shaped by these countries’ domestic political constraints,
budgetary limitations, legal requirements, and the need to respond to
other threats as well (most notably North Korea for Japan and South
Korea). Further afield, despite occasional debates about whether or not to
lift the ban, European states and analysts have maintained the post-
Tiananmen arms embargo, but play a smaller role than the US, Japan,
South Korea, or Australia in giving voice to concerns about the implications
of China’s military modernisation drive.
Surprisingly, despite being the main focus of China’s military moderni-
sation throughout most of the last two decades, most observers have as-
sessed Taiwan’s response to China’s military build-up as a case of under-
balancing, providing an interesting puzzle for analysts. The threat is unde-
niable and widely recognised today. For example, as Shlapak and his col-
leagues found in their 2009 A Question of Balance, in which they revisited
the issue of how a cross-Strait military conflict would likely play out, the
PLA’s investments in conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, more capa-
ble fighters and fighter-bombers, and naval modernisation have put Bei-
jing on the cusp of having a potential war-winning option in the Taiwan
Strait, especially if the PLA can destroy all of Taiwan’s airfields and naval
ports early on in a conflict. (35) Despite this clear and growing threat, Tai-
wan’s defence budget has been largely static, and its armed forces are
falling behind in terms of the air and naval platform head-to-head match-
ups with their PLA counterparts. Research by Michael Chase has sug-
gested that domestic politics largely explain Taipei’s relatively anaemic
military response. (36) Still, not all observers agree with the notion that Tai-
wan has insufficiently upgraded its defences during this period, pointing
to changes in defence strategy from “decisive campaign outside the ter-
ritory” to “resolute defence and effective deterrence”; (37) the purchase of
large US defence packages (including the acquisition of missile de-
fences); (38) and the development of technologies designed to target vul-
nerable Chinese surface vessels, such as the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship bal-
listic missile. (39) In this issue, Arthur Ding and Paul Huang weigh in to pres-
ent their own views.
This issue of China Perspectives examines all of the issues discussed
above in greater detail. It starts off with an essay by Richard Bitzinger, who
provides an overview of China’s military modernisation efforts and identi-
fies those elements that have made the most progress and those that are
lagging. As Bitzinger notes, a dramatic increase in the capabilities of se-
lected parts of the PLA has created “areas of excellence,” something akin
to “an army within an army.” At the same time that it has been building
these advanced capabilities in strategic sectors of the force, the PLA has
also been pursuing a broader set of upgrades aimed at both mechanising
and informationising (or integrating computers and communications/
data-sharing capabilities) the armed forces as a whole. These develop-
ments mean that the PLA as a whole is getting more networked, enabling
it to pursue more complex integrated joint operations with multiple serv-
ices acting in support of each other over greater distances. At the same
time, select strategic forces such as the Second Artillery, the PLA Navy, and
China’s cyber-warfare forces are not having to wait for the military as a
whole to modernise, but are pressing ahead rapidly to acquire critical ca-
pabilities designed to prevent Taiwan from pursuing independence and the
US from intervening should cross-Strait conflict break out. And since the
mid-2000s, the PLA has begun to focus on acquiring capabilities designed
for contingencies “beyond the Strait,” (40) fuelled in part by a growing con-
fidence about the cross-Strait military balance, in part by its need to justify
continued defence upgrades, and in part by the requirement that the PLA
be able to support “new historic missions,” as outlined by President Hu Jin-
tao in late 2004. (41)
Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip, in their contribution, look at how the
PLA’s growing capabilities have been affecting China’s relationships with
Japan, South Korea, and Australia, three major US allies near China that
have expressed anxiety about the capabilities China is acquiring and the
implications of these for China’s intentions. Beijing’s acquisition of anti-ac-
cess/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities is serving to undermine these three
countries’ confidence in the US’s extended deterrence guarantee, and in
order to respond, all three nations are tightening up defence cooperation
with Washington and building up their abilities to defend themselves from
missile and submarine threats by acquiring missile defences and building
up their anti-submarine warfare forces, often through expanded submarine
fleets of their own. In exploring how the three Asian-Pacific nations are re-
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sponding to China’s military modernisation, the authors examine com-
ments and analyses from military and academic observers, as well as pub-
lic opinion data and media editorials. In so doing, they find that something
akin to a bipolar structure is emerging in the region, with Tokyo, Seoul, and
Canberra counterbalancing their growing economic dependence on China
with tighter political-diplomatic and military cooperation with the United
States and each other, as well as with selected partner nations in South
and Southeast Asia. While Japan appears to be moving most actively to-
wards reinforcing its ability to hedge against a conflict with China, Aus-
tralia and South Korea are moving in a similar direction. Their conclusions
support a 2008 RAND study that found US security partners increasingly
hedging in their responses to China’s military modernisation, even as they
continued to deepen their economic interdependency with the PRC. (42)
Matthieu Dûchatel and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix, in their essay, ex-
plore how the PRC’s investments in naval modernisation are affecting Eu-
ropean Union members’ interests and why foreign policy elites in Europe
have tended to underappreciate what the continent has at stake in China’s
military modernisation choices. They find that because China’s new sur-
face vessels and submarine forces are not seen as threatening European
states directly, many European analysts mistakenly conclude that the Con-
tinent’s interests are not much affected by China’s choices. By contrast,
Dûchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix argue that the EU has at least five impor-
tant interests that Chinese naval modernisation affects, including the way
in which it is enabling, and perhaps even incentivising, Beijing to pursue
more forcefully arguments it has previously advanced about the Law of the
Sea and territorial disputes in the East and South China seas, with follow-
on consequences for Europe’s trade with other East Asian nations, its rela-
tionship with the United States, and the global economy. In reaching this
conclusion, Dûchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix echo arguments made by some
US scholars who have warned that the leading edge of Chinese military as-
sertiveness may be a new “naval nationalism” that may destabilise the re-
gion over off-shore disputes. (43)
Finally, as Arthur Ding and Paul Huang highlight in their essay, observers
based in Taiwan have not been as alarmed by China’s military modernisa-
tion efforts as balance of power realists might predict. Instead, Ding and
Huang find that it is the tenor and atmosphere of repeated interactions
between the two sides of the Strait that have framed the perceptions of
Taiwan analysts about the level of threat that the mainland poses to Tai-
wan more than the specific hardware and capabilities China is developing.
In this sense, Ding and Huang suggest that while a focus on China’s mili-
tary modernisation may be useful, it is certainly not the only and probably
not the most important trend shaping cross-Strait relations. Instead, for a
number of reasons, including Taiwan’s inability to compete head-to-head
with the mainland on military power and its faith in the support of the
United States, the political state of the cross-Strait relationship appears to
be the most important determinant of how great a threat China is per-
ceived to pose to Taiwan.
As the essays in this special issue attest, China’s military modernisation
drive, and in particular its decision to focus on the acquisition of asym-
metric and destabilising technologies, is fuelling a regional arms race and
the expansion of strategic balancing behaviour. Countries’ specific deci-
sions about how to respond to the PLA’s growing capabilities reflect a
host of factors, including the extent to which their interests overlap or
are in conflict with China’s; the tenor of their relationship with China and
their assessments of Beijing’s intentions; their vulnerability to specific
weapons systems and their proximity to the PRC; their focus on other
threats; and their domestic politics. Military modernisation alone is of
course insufficient to explain China’s relationships with its neighbours; at
the same time, no assessment of the PRC’s ties with its neighbours,
diplomatic partners, or Taiwan would be complete without an under-
standing of how the military dimension affects these relationships.
China’s decisions about the ways in which it improves its military capa-
bilities carry important and strategic consequences for the country’s re-
lationships with its neighbours. Looking to the future, Beijing will have to
decide whether or not the political-diplomatic and military costs of
countries’ reactions to China’s military modernisation outweigh the ben-
efits of defence development. For the first time since the end of the Cold
War, China’s military power is being widely talked about as a factor that
is destabilising the region. Whether or not China’s leaders continue to
prioritise defence modernisation choices that target regional adversaries
in a destabilising fashion could help determine the level of regional co-
operation or confrontation in the future.
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